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Abstract 
This paper on the relationship and effect of Credit and Liquidity Risk and on Bank Default Risk among Deposit 
Money Banks in Nigeria is aimed at assessing the extent to which the relationship between credit risk and 
liquidity risk influence the probability of bank defaults among deposit money banks, a study of First bank of 
Nigeria Plc. The study adopted experimental research design where questionnaires were administered to a 
sample size of eighty (80) respondents. The data obtained were presented in tables and analyzed using simple 
percentages. The formulated hypotheses were tested using the Pearson product moment correlation and chi- 
square statistical tool. The results of the study revealed that there is a positive relationship between liquidity risk 
and credit risk. This is based on the fact that an increase in credit risk (bad loan), the loan (asset) portfolio of 
such a bank is negatively affected causing an increase in bank illiquidity. Also, liquidity risk and credit risk 
jointly contribute to bank default risk. Based on the findings, it was recommended that internal loan and credit 
monitoring strategies should be implemented in full to ensure that loans and credit granted to customers are 
collected in full plus interest thereon and deposit money banks should not maintain excess liquidity simply 
because they want to effectively manage their liquidity position. 
 
1. Introduction 
The impact of liquidity in the management of financial institutions such as deposit money banks remained 
fascinating and intriguing, though very elusive in the process of an investment analysis visa-visa bank portfolio 
management. There appears to be an interminable argument in the literature over the years on the roles meaning 
and determinants of liquidity and credit management. The Nigeria financial environment has noticed increase in 
credit which has become a problem to the country. Banks have traditionally provided liquidity on demand both 
to borrowers with open lines of credit and un-drawn loan commitments and to depositors in the form of checking 
and other transactions account.  In fact the combination of these two products in a single firm constitutes 
working definition of a bank. The liquidity insurance role of banks however exposes them to the risk that they 
will have insufficient cash to meet random demands from their depositors and borrowers. 
 There is a large theoretical literature that attempts to understand banks role in liquidity production. This 
literature initially emphasized this risk associated with demand deposits that expose banks to the possibility of a 
catastrophic run. Diamond and Dybig (1983) explain the structure of banks by arguing that by pooling their 
funds in an intermediary, agents can insure against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks while still investing most of 
their wealth in high-return but illiquid projects. This structure however, leads to the potential for a self-fulfilling 
bank run and sets up a policy rationale for deposit insurance. More recent theoretical and empirical studies have 
focused on liquidity risk coming from the asset side of the bank’s balance sheet. Banks that make commitments 
to lend are exposed to the risk of unexpected liquidity demands from their borrowers. 
 Credit control is described to maximize the value of the firm by achieving a trade off. The purpose of credit 
control is to maximize sales while minimizing the risk of bad debt as far as possible. In fact the firm should 
manage its credit in such a way that sales are expanded to an extent to which risk remain within an acceptable 
limit. These costs include the credit administration expenses, bad debt losses and opportunity cost of the fund 
tied up in receivables. The aim of liquidity management should be to regulate and control these cost that cannot 
be eliminated together.         
 
1.1 Objective of the study 
Given the increased range of banks client (depositors and loan customers) and volume of credit transactions in 
the Nigerian economy, it is expedient for banks to have a full fledged Cash monitoring policy in order to remain 
in business. The cash credit monitoring will enable the bank grant credit to customers and sectors applying for 
loans at an agreed interest rate which is an income to boost the profit level of banks and at the same time 
ensuring the availability of adequate cash and liquid assets to meets it financial obligation. 
Thus, the objectives of this paper include but not limited to the following: 
a. To assess to what extent credit risk and liquidity risk influence the probability of bank defaults. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.16, 2014 
 
143 
b. To establish the relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk in deposit money banks 
 
1.2 Research Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I 
Ho: There is no positive relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in deposit money banks. 
Hi: There is a positive relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in deposit money banks. 
Hypothesis II 
Ho: Liquidity risk and credit risk do not jointly contribute to bank probability of default. 
 Hi: Liquidity risk and credit risk jointly contribute to bank probability of default. 
 
1.3 Organisation of the study 
The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. The literature review is contained in section 2. Research 
methodology is found in section 3. Section 4 contains data presentation, analysis and discussion of findings, 
while conclusion and recommendations are stated in section 5. 
 
2. Review of Related Literature 
Credit risk is a serious threat to the performance of banks which when unchecked would lead to the total collapse 
of banks. Liquidity risk also act as a snare to banks with an unsound risk assessment and control policy. In the 
face of current events in the banking sector, these two risks cannot be ignored as they have considerable bearing 
on the performance and survival of banks (Coyle, 2000). In order to reduce the combined effect of these risks on 
the overall default risk of banks, there is need for efficient credit and liquidity management policies to be 
formulated and fully implemented in banks. 
Credit management policy is a comprehensive process that deals with identifying the target markets, credit 
extension; credit monitoring and identifying the proceeds. Credit management policy entails the mechanisms, 
standards and parameters that guide the bank officers in granting loans and managing the loan portfolio under the 
banking discipline. It is a set of guidelines designed to maximize cost associated with credit while maximizing 
benefits from it (McNaughton, 1996). Marsh (2008) further added that credit management policy assist financial 
institutions’ credit department in the extension of credit privileges governed by rules and guidelines established 
by top management. 
According to Jhingan (2010), a bank needs a high degree of liquidity in its assets portfolio. The liquidity of 
assets refers to the ease and certainty with which it can be turned into cash. The bank must hold a sufficient large 
proportion of its assets in the form of cash and liquid assets for the purpose of profitability. If the bank keeps 
liquidity the uppermost, its profit will be low. In the other hand, if it ignores liquidity and aims at earning more, 
it will be disastrous for it. This in managing is investment portfolio a bank must strike a balance between the 
objectives of liquidity and profitability. This balance must be achieved with a relatively high degree of safety. 
According to Graham (1990), profitability is always associated with performance and productivity, therefore true 
pure profit is the increase in wealth that an investor gets out making an investment taking into consideration all 
costs associated with it including the opportunity cost of capital. In the banking industry, every credit granted 
attracts an interest to the bank. Hence bank lending operations are risky but very profitability. In order to 
minimize these risks inherent in banking activities, there is need for efficient, effective and strategic credit and 
liquidity management, which will in turn accelerate the tempo of profits. 
 
2.1 The relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk  
What is the relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in financial institutions? Classical theories of 
macroeconomics of banking support the view that liquidity risk and credit risk are closely linked. Both industrial 
organization models of banking such as the Monti-Klein framework and the financial intermediation perspective 
in Bryant(1980) and Diamond and Dybig (1983), suggest that a bank asset and liquidity structure are closely 
connected, especially with regards to borrowers default and fund withdrawals. 
Over the past 50 to 60 years, a tremendous amount of literature has dealt with banks’ liquidity and credit risks. 
The financial intermediation models view banks as pools of liquidity which provide both depositors and 
borrowers with the ready availability of cash, thereby enhancing economic welfare and internalizing economic 
liquidity risk while the industrial organization approach models view banks as profit maximizing price takers in 
oligopolistic loan and deposit markets; on the asset side, banks generate returns through loan interest rates on the 
liabilities side bank face costs through deposit interest rate. The models of both stands of literature suggest that at 
least in theory there is a relationship between liquidity and credit risk. A liquidity risk is seen as a profit lowering 
cost, a loan default increases this liquidity risk because of the lowered cash inflow and depreciation it triggers. 
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Diamond and Rajan (2005) opined that there is a positive relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk. This 
model is based on the premise that banks obtain money from unskilled depositors which is used for lending. 
Problems arise if too many economic projects funded with loans yield insufficient funds (or even defaults) and 
the bank cannot meet depositors’ demands. Due to this asset deterioration, more and more depositors will claim 
back their money. The bank will call in all loans and thereby reduce aggregate liquidity. The result is therefore 
that higher credit risk accompanies higher liquidity risk through depositors demand. According to Acharya 
(2011), financial firms raise debts which have to be rolled over constantly and which is used to finance assets 
and as such more debt in the banking system yields a higher “bank-run” risk. In times of crisis when assets prices 
deteriorate, banks find it more difficult to roll over debt, this becomes a liquidity problem. 
Having established the relationship between liquidity and credit risk from a theoretical perspective, the logical 
follow-up question then is how are banks affected by this relationship in their overall risk structure? Gatev and 
Strahan (2009), said that banks’ default risks is mainly driven by low capitalization, low earnings, over exposure 
to certain categories of loans and excessive loan default. To him, excessive investment banking activities, bad 
macroeconomic conditions in the banks immediate vicinity, low equity and heavy concentrations in real estate 
loans substantially increase bank probability of default.  
From the theoretical evidence presented above, and the anecdotal evidence of bank failure during the recent 
crisis in Nigeria, it can be an indication that the joint occurrence of liquidity risk and credit risk might have 
played a role in causing banks default and institutionalized collapse of deposit money banks in the Nigerian 
financial environment. 
 
2.1.1 The Influence of Liquidity Risk and Credit Risk on Bank Default Probability 
From a theoretical perspective, the relationship between liquidity risks and credit risks therefore seems to be 
clearly established. The logical follow-up question then is: how are banks affected by this relationship in their 
overall risk structure? To derive a testable hypothesis for this question, we draw on the literature explaining bank 
defaults. After all, the ultimate risk a bank faces is the risk of going out of business. A thorough understanding of 
bank risk should therefore focus on bank default reasons. There is a vast body of empirical literature testing the 
influence a wide variety of accounting-, market- and general economic factors have on banks’ PDs. Papers such 
as Meyer and Pfifer (1970), Martin (1977), Whalen and Thomson (1988), Espahbodi (1991), Thomson (1991, 
1992), Cole and Fenn (1995), Cole and Gunther (1995, 1998), and Kolari, Glennon, Shin and Caputo (2002) 
show that banks’default risk is mainly driven by low capitalization, low earnings, over-exposure to certain 
categories of loans, and excessive loan defaults. Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010), Ng and Roychowdhury 
(2011), Cole and White (2012), Berger and Bouwman (2013), and DeYoung and Torna (2013) are especially 
relevant to our work because they focus on bank defaults during the recent financial crisis. Generally, they find 
that excessive investment banking activities, bad macroeconomic conditions in the banks’ immediate vicinity, 
low equity, and heavy concentrations in real estate loans substantially increased banks’ PDs during the recent 
crisis. Interestingly, all these studies provide clear evidence that credit risk plays a vital part for the overall 
stability condition of a bank, but largely ignore liquidity risk. Although some studies include proxies for 
liquidity, they mostly focus on the CAMEL-based6 asset-side liquidity (i.e. the relationship of short-term to 
long-term assets) or the general funding liquidity (such as the ratio of short-term to long-term deposits). Maturity 
transformation risks are therefore largely ignored, just as the relationship between liquidity risks and credit risks. 
 
Deeper insight into the matter is only provided by two papers. An empirical study of Acharya and Mora (2013) 
explains the role of banks as liquidity providers during financial crises. In doing so, they provide evidence that 
failed banks during the recent financial crisis suffered from liquidity shortages just before the actual default. 
Apparently, distressed banks faced severe liquidity issues, especially in comparison to healthy banks. They 
document this by showing that failed or near-failed banks scramble for (retail) deposits by offering high CD rates 
in aggressive marketing campaigns. Indirectly, their results point to the fact that the joint occurrence of liquidity 
and credit risk might push banks into default. A more direct channel of how liquidity and credit risk can jointly 
cause default is theoretically shown by He and Xiong (2012b). They analyze the relationship between liquidity 
and credit risk from a company’s wholesale funding perspective. The channel they identify which connects 
liquidity risk to credit risk and ultimately with default risk is debt rollover risk. The results of the paper show that 
investors demand higher illiquidity premia for corporate bonds due to liquidity risk in the market for corporate 
bonds. Upon rolling over their companies’ debt in illiquid bond markets and in order to avoid default, equity 
holders of the issuing firms must pay for the difference between the lower liquidity premia in matured bonds and 
the higher illiquidity premia in newly issued bonds.  
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As a consequence of having to absorb these losses on behalf of the debt holders, equity holders might therefore 
choose to default earlier. An illiquidity shock in corporate debt markets can therefore lead to higher default rates. 
Although the presented model encompasses corporate debt in general, they specifically relate their results to 
financial institutions. The findings of He and Xiong (2012b) are especially relevant in light of recent research 
showing that companies, especially financial institutions, are prone to very shortterm debt structures 
(Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 2013), which increase the frequency of debt rollovers. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
A cross sectional study design was used where data was collected to ascertain the relationship between the 
independent variables (x) and the dependent variables (y). The research design used in this study is the 
experimental research design which was used by the researcher to test the formulated hypotheses in order to 
teach a valid conclusion about the relationship between the variables that are being tested. 
The unit of analysis for the questionnaire is organization. All responses pertaining to both dependent and 
independent variables are measured on six-point Likert scale. The data collected were analyzed by Pearson 
correlation test and chi- square test. 
 
In testing hypothesis one with correlation, the responses of the respondents are ranked in order of strength; 
Strongly Agree (SA)               -5 
Agree (A)    -4 
Undecided (U)    -3 
Disagree (D)    -2 
Strongly Disagree (SD)         -1 
The ranked responses are called the “X” variables while the number of respondents to a given response is the 
“Y” variables. Using the Pearson product moment correlation, the degree of relationship of the variables is 
expressed as: 
r =   N∑XY – (∑X)(∑Y) 
      √ {[N∑(X) 2 - (∑X) 2] [N∑(y) 2 - (∑y) 2]}      
Where: 
r = Correlation result (coefficient) 
N = Number of Items 
∑ = Summation  
Decision Rule: 
a. If r =0.0 – 0.3 there is  negligible relationship, hence, accept Ho (the null hypothesis) 
b. If r = 0.3 -0.5, there is a low relationship, Hence accept Ho. 
c. If r = 0.5-0.8, these is a substantial relationship. Hence, reject Ho and accept Hi 
d. If r = 0.9-1.0, There is a very high relationship hence, reject Ho and accept Hi. 
In testing the hypotheses with the chi-square, the tabulated data obtained from respondents is referred to as the 
observed frequency. To obtain the expected frequencies contingency table, the frequencies in the cells are 
computed thus  
Frequency = RT × CT ÷ GT                                                                                    
Where: 
RT = Row Total 
CT = Column Total 
GT = Grand Total 
 Having obtained the expected frequency table, the computed chi-square table is drawn to obtain the 
computed X2 value with the formula expressed as; 
X2 = ∑(Fo - Fe)2 
             Fe 
X2 = Chi-square 
Fo = Observed Frequency 
Fe = Expected Frequency  
The tabulated chi-square (X2) value is computed using a degree freedom of (C-1) (R-1) at 0.05 level of 
significance 
Decision Rule: If the calculated chi-square is greater than the tabulated chi-square, reject the null hypothesis 
(Ho) and accept the alternative hypothesis (Hi). If otherwise, the reverse is the case. 
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4. Data Analysis and Test of Hypotheses 
4.1 Data analysis 
Table 1: There is a positive relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk in banks 
Reponses  Male  Female  Total  Percentage (%) 
SA 20 15 35 44 
A 10 10 20 25 
U 10 0 10 12 
D 0 0 0 0 
SD 10 5 15 19 
Total  50 30 80 100 
Source: Field Survey 2014. 
Table 2: Liquidity risk and credit risk jointly affect bank probability of default 
Reponses  Male  Female  Total  Percentage (%) 
SA 35 5 35 44 
A 10 10 20 25 
U 10 0 10 13 
D 0 5 5 5 
SD 0 10 10 13 
Total  50 30 80 100 
Source: Field Survey 2014. 
Table 3: The level of bank liquidity affects the investment portfolio performance of banks 
Reponses  Male  Female  Total  Percentage (%) 
SA 40 20 60 75 
A 10 5 15 19 
U 0 5 5 6 
D 0 0 0 0 
SD 0 0 0 0 
Total  50 30 80 100 
Source: Field Survey 2014. 
Table 4: Banks are aware of the increasing effect of credit and liquidity risks on bank performance 
Reponses  Male  Female  Total  Percentage (%) 
SA 19 8 27 34 
A 16 4 20 25 
U 4 3 7 9 
D 11 10 21 26 
SD 0 5 5 6 
Total  50 30 80 100 
Source: Field Survey 2014  
 
In table 1, 44% strongly agreed, 12% agreed, 0% were undecided, 19% disagreed and 0% strongly disagreed that 
there is a positive relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk. 
In table 2, 44% strongly agreed, 25% agreed, 13% were undecided, 5% disagreed and 13% strongly disagreed 
that liquidity and credit risk jointly affects bank probability of default. 
In table 3, 75% strongly agreed, 19% agreed, 6% were undecided, that liquidity affects the investment portfolio 
performance of banks. 
In table 4, 34% strongly agreed, 25% agreed, 9% were undecided, 26% disagreed and 6% strongly disagreed that 
banks are aware of the increasing effect of credit and liquidity risks. 
 
4.2 Test of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I 
Ho: There is no significant relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in deposit banks. 
H1: There is a significant relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in deposit banks. 
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Table 5: Response from question 1 
Responses  Total From males and females  (frequency)  
SA 35 
A 20 
U 10 
D 0 
SD 15 
Total  80 
Source: Field Survey, 2014 
Table 6: Pearson product moment correlation of the relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in deposit 
banks 
Responses (X) Frequency (y) X2 Y2 XY 
5 35 25 1225 175 
4 20 16 400 80 
3 10 9 100 30 
2 0 4 0 0 
1 15 1 225 15 
∑X=15 ∑Y=80 ∑X2=55 ∑y2=1950 ∑XY=300 
Source: Computation from table 5 
r =   N∑XY – (∑x) (∑y) 
√[N∑(X)2 -(∑X)2] [N∑(Y)2 -(∑Y)2 
r =   5(300) – (15) (80) 
√[5(55) -(15)2] [5(1950) -(80)2 
r =   1500-1200 
√50 x 3350       
r =  300/ 409.3 = 0.73 
Decision: The correlation coefficient (r = 0.73) means that there is a very high relationship between the variables 
tested. We therefore reject Ho and accept Hi which states that there is a positive relationship between liquidity 
risk and credit risk in deposit banks. 
Hypothesis II 
Ho: Liquidity Risk and credit risk do not jointly contribute to bank default risk. 
Hi: Liquidity Risk and credit risk do jointly contribute to bank default risk. 
Table 7: Contingency values of hypothesis II 
Responses  Male  Female Total 
SA 30  (21.9)  5  (13.1) 35 
A 10  (12.5)  10  (7.5) 20 
U 10  (6.3)   0   (3.7) 10 
D  0   (3.1)   5   (1.9) 5 
SD  0   (6.3)  10   (3.7) 10 
Total   50  (50) 30  (30) 80 
Source: (Response to question 2) 
Table 8: Calculated Chi-square value of the contribution of credit and liquidity risks on bank default risk 
Responses  Respondents   Fo Fe Fo-fe (Fo-fe)2 (Fo-Fe)2/Fe 
SA M 30 21.9 8.1 65.61 3.00 
 F 5 13.1 -8.1 65.61 5.01 
A M 10 12.5 -2.5 6.25 0.50 
 F 10 7.5 2.5 6.25 0.83 
U M 0 6.3 3.7 13.69 2.17 
 F 0 3.7 -3.7 13.69 3.70 
D M 5 3.1 -3.1 9.61 3.10 
 F 0 1.9 3.1 9.61 5.06 
SD M 10 6.3 -6.3 39.69 6.30 
 F  3.7 6.3 39.69 10.73 
Total       ∑ = 40.40 
Source: Researcher’s computation 
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The critical chi-square value is computed as  
DF = (C-1) (R-1) = (5-1) (2-1) = 4 x 1 =4 
The level of significance = 0.05 
Hence tabulated X2 =4df @0.05 =9.488 
Decision: Since the computed chi-square value of 40.40 is greater than the critical chi-square value of 9.488 we 
reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative which states that liquidity risk and credit risk jointly 
contribute to bank default risk. 
 
4.3 Discussion of findings  
From the presentation of data, analysis of tabulated data and the test of hypotheses, it is evident that the survival 
of deposit banks is anchored on the strategies formulated and implemented to manage both credit risk and 
liquidity risk. From the tested hypotheses, the following were observed; 
a. There is a positive relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk. This is based on the fact that an 
increase in credit risk (bad loan), the loan (asset) portfolio of such a bank is negatively affected causing 
increase in bank illiquidity. Meaning that an increase in credit risk brings a corresponding increase in 
liquidity risk and vice versa. This finding agrees with the findings of Diamond and Rajan (2005) that 
advances the existence of a positive relationship between credit risk and liquidity risk. 
 
b. Liquidity risk and credit risk jointly contribute to bank default risk. Default risk is the potentiality of a 
bank not being able to provide cash for customers’ withdrawal and credit application. When a bank’s 
loan in the hands of customers cannot be accounted for by the bank (i.e. cannot be received), the 
liquidity of the bank becomes reduced, and, in the face of this liquidity dilemma the banks are exposed 
to runs. Thus, with these combined risks, the bank has a higher probability of default. This finding is 
further validated by the findings of Gatev and Strahan (2009) who opined that over exposure to certain 
categories of loan and excessive loan default substantially increase bank probability of default. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Deposit money banks that have experienced institutionalized distress and unintentional collapse over the years 
had loopholes in risk assessment and control policies. Both credit risk and liquidity risks were not adequately 
and efficiently managed, and this in turn affected the profitability and overall performance of these banks. The 
increase in loss of profit (accumulated losses) reduced the liquidity of these banks, which eventually led to their 
liquidation. Credit risks and liquidity risks are positively related, that is to say that there is a direct relationship 
between credit risk and liquidity risk. If credit risk increases, liquidity risk increases in same proportion, and if 
credit risk falls, liquidity risk also falls. They also jointly contribute to banks probability of default. If these risks 
are not properly managed and controlled, banks will have an increasing potential of default in meeting their 
financial obligations as they fall due. 
In conclusion, the result of this study suggests that a joint management of liquidity risk and credit risk in a bank 
could reduce uncertainties and substantially increase bank stability. This result support and underpins recent 
regulatory efforts like the Basel III framework and the Dodd frank Act of 1983 which put stronger emphasis on 
the importance of liquidity risk management in conjunction with the asset quality and credit risk of a bank. 
It can thus be recommended that, internal loan and credit monitoring strategies should be implemented in full to 
ensure that loans and credit granted to customers are collected in full plus interest thereon and banks should not 
maintain excess liquidity simply because they want to effectively manage their liquidity position. This would 
help reduce the incidence of cash sterility in the asset of banks. 
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